Our Moral Blindspot-Moral Worth and the Arbitrary Distinction of Species
Ronald Dworkin, one of the most influential legal and political philosophers of the past century, makes the bold statement in his book Taking Rights Seriously, that all (respectable) contemporary political theories start with a basic idea-the idea of equality. Not equality in economic distribution. Not even necessarily equality in the distribution of rights and opportunities. But instead, equality in a broad moral sense: That all people are deserving of equal moral consideration and that a system of political thought should reflect this assumption.
What a powerful statement. Marxism, liberalism, libertarianism, utilitarianism. All of these theories which are usually seen as having wildly and oftentimes irreconcilable differences all stem from the same idea-that of equal moral worth. I start by introducing this notion, however, so I can introduce the contention of this article, that being what I wish to call our ‘moral blindspot’. That blindspot is this: All of these theories, correctly, grant that all people are worthy of equal moral consideration. We no longer rely on arbitrary distinctions between people. It is not, as has been the case in the not so distant past, that people of different races, gender… are claimed to be worthy of different levels of consideration. Nor is it that people who, say, provide more to society or have higher IQ’s deserve greater moral consideration. These people may be rewarded unequally but this is no reflection on their moral worth relative to those who society bestows with fewer rewards. But here is the issue: we do still rely on a completely arbitrary divide which bestows some with moral consideration and some with almost none: That is the arbitrary division of species.
All of these theories now recognise that to base a system of moral worth on such arbitrary characteristics as race or sex is outdated and unreasonable. It cannot be justified. So why can we justify using species in that very same way? I think a careful examination of the foundations of many of the great contemporary political theories will show that there are two main reasons: that of convenience and that of background societal norms which even our greatest minds cannot unshackle themselves from.
It is terribly inconvenient to have to grant non-human animals moral consideration. What would Rawls’s Theory of Justice look like if it had to contend with the concerns of pigs, cats, and dogs? To paint a picture, imagine what choices parties in the original position would make in regards to just guiding principles if their species was one of those details hidden behind a veil of ignorance? It is an interesting enough theory just having to account for whether you are black or white, male or female, Christian or utilitarian. Imagine if these parties also had to account for whether they were pig or cow, human or ape, or cat or dog. I find it highly unlikely that modern factory farming would be endorsed, or our current deforestation and destruction of natural habitats sustained, or indeed our use of animals in research; at least without a revolutionary reorganisation of the way all these things are done.
The main purpose of this short piece is to introduce readers to this moral blindspot. It can be compared, quite justifiably in my opinion, to previous blindspots when it has come to arbitrary distinctions based on sex and race. In 1989 Susan Moller Okin criticized John Rawls’s ‘Justice as Fairness’ with the powerful one-liner, justice as fairness: for whom? Political Theory was, and to some extent remains an androcentric ambition. Okin suggests that this heavily limits Rawls’s theory as it fails to be an adequate account of justice for women. This is of course a marked error and one that Rawls does his best to account for in his final work- Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. But I ask again: Justice as Fairness: for whom?
If androcentrism is an elephant in the philosopher’s room, then anthropocentrism is a blue whale fighting for its life in the corner. Okin has already pointed out that our current norms and convictions hinder our ability to do political philosophy, often leading to damaging inconsistencies for past oppressed groups. One of those norms and convictions is that only human beings are those who carry moral worth, as it was assumed that men were once, and rich men before that. Whether the origins of this idea lay in our ‘nature’ as hunter-gatherers, religious ideas of dominion or propaganda from the farming industry are, for now at least, inconsequential. All we need to say is that it is a cornerstone of political thought and wider philosophy in general, that humans, and humans alone, are those who carry moral worth.
The points made in this short piece are ones I wish to dive into deeper in my future academic work. If true, our blindspot when it comes to denying non-human animals moral consideration is devastating, and every day we fail to acknowledge this leads to the abuse of millions of living, suffering, beings. But here is the good news: The foundations for these theories already exist. We do not need to build entirely new theories from the ground up. We simply need to expand our current ones to include the moral consideration of non-human animals in the same way that Rawls did in response to Okin.
Thank you for reading.
